We develop canonical rules capable of axiomatizing all systems of multiple-conclusion rules over K4 or IPC , by extension of the method of canonical formulas by Zakharyaschev [37] . We use the framework to give an alternative proof of the known analysis of admissible rules in basic transitive logics, which additionally yields the following dichotomy: any canonical rule is either admissible in the logic, or it is equivalent to an assumption-free rule. Other applications of canonical rules include a generalization of the Blok-Esakia theorem and the theory of modal companions to systems of multiple-conclusion rules or (finitary structural global) consequence relations, and a characterization of splittings in the lattices of consequence relations over monomodal or superintuitionistic logics with the finite model property.
Introduction
Investigation of propositional logics usually revolves around provability of formulas. When we generalize the problem from formulas to inference rules, there arises an important distinction between derivable and admissible rules, introduced by Lorenzen [26] . A rule ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n / ψ is derivable if it can be derived from the postulated axioms and rules of the logic (such as modus ponens, or necessitation) by composition (see Section 2 for definition of rule derivation); and it is admissible if the set of theorems of the logic is closed under the rule. These two notions coincide for the standard consequence relation of classical logic, but nonclassical logics often admit rules which are not derivable. For example, all intermediate (superintuitionistic, si) logics admit the Kreisel-Putnam rule ¬p → q ∨ r / (¬p → q) ∨ (¬p → r), * A part of the research was done while the author was visiting the Department of Computer Science of the University of Toronto. Supported by grants IAA900090703 and IAA1019401 of GA AVČR, and grant 1M0545 of MŠMTČR.
whereas many of these logics (such as IPC itself) do not derive this rule.
An obvious application of admissible rules is to shorten and simplify derivations in a given logic. An admissible rule applied to valid theorems of the logic again produces a valid theorem of the logic, even if the rule itself may be invalid. Admissible rules are also a fundamental structural property of the logic, as they form the largest consequence relation which yields the logic (as a set of formulas). The prominence of this consequence relation is stressed by the fact that it can be uniquely defined using only the set of theorems of the logic, unlike the usual consequence relation of derivable rules. There are also some practical applications of admissibility and its special case, unification, e.g., in description logics [1] .
The research of admissible rules was stimulated by a question of H. Friedman [11] , asking whether admissibility of rules in IPC is decidable. The problem was extensively investigated in a series of papers by Rybakov, who has shown that admissibility is decidable for a large class of modal and intermediate logics, found semantic criteria for admissibility, and obtained other results on various aspects of admissibility. His results on admissible rules in transitive modal and si logics are summarized in the monograph [29] . He also applied his method to tense logics [30, 31, 32] . Ghilardi [12, 13] discovered the connection of admissibility to projective formulas and unification, which provided another criteria for admissibility in certain modal and intermediate logics, and new decision procedures for admissibility in some modal and si systems. Ghilardi's results were utilized by Iemhoff [14, 15, 16] to construct an explicit basis of admissible rules for IPC and some other si logics, and to develop Kripke semantics for admissible rules. These results were extended to modal logics by Jeřábek [18] . We note that decidability of admissibility is by no means automatic. An artificial decidable modal logic with undecidable admissibility problem was constructed by Chagrov [5] , and natural examples of bimodal logics with undecidable admissibility (or even unification) problem were found by Wolter and Zakharyaschev [35] . In terms of computational complexity, admissibility in basic transitive logics is coNE -complete by Jeřábek [20] , in contrast to PSPACE -completeness of derivability in these logics.
In short, there are two basic approaches to the analysis of admissible rules that have been followed in the literature: one is the strategy of Rybakov, which relies on the combinatorics of universal frames of finite rank; the other is the strategy of Ghilardi and Iemhoff, using projectivity and extension properties of classes of finite frames. In this paper, we introduce a new approach based on canonical rules.
The idea of axiomatization of logics using frame-based (or algebra-based) formulas 1 first appeared in the frame formulas of Jankov [17] and Fine [9] , and the subframe formulas of Fine [10] . A systematic investigation was undertaken by Zakharyaschev, who discovered canonical formulas which axiomatize all si logics, and all quasinormal extensions of K4 [37] . Canonical formulas for linear tense logics were found by Wolter [33] . Canonical formulas proved to be a powerful general tool for the study of various properties of modal and si logics, in particular the finite model property (cf. [38, 39, 6, 34] ).
We will generalize this idea from formulas to rules. Following [18] , we will actually work with multiple-conclusion rules ϕ 1 , . . . , ϕ n / ψ 1 , . . . , ψ m which considerably simplifies the presentation. (Multiple-conclusion rules were also suggested by Kracht [24, 25] .) We define certain frame-based multiple-conclusion rules, called the canonical rules, and we establish that every system of rules extending (the global consequence relation of) K4 or IPC can be axiomatized by canonical rules. We further define singleconclusion canonical rules, which are certain combinations of canonical rules expressible as one single-conclusion rule, and show that they axiomatize all single-conclusion rule systems (i.e., finitary structural global consequence relations) extending K4 or IPC . We apply the general machinery to admissible rules of basic transitive or linearly ordered logics (K4, S4, GL, IPC , K4.3, S4.3, GL.3) as well as all logics inheriting their admissible rules in Section 4. We will show that for these logics, there exists a simple combinatorial criterion to recognize which canonical rules are admissible. In this way we obtain an alternative proof of decidability of admissibility in each of these systems, as well as a description of a basis of admissible rules. Furthermore, the proof gives a new result about admissible rules in these logics, a kind of dichotomy property: every canonical rule is either admissible, or equivalent to a rule without assumptions. Formulated without reference to canonical rules, this means that every rule is equivalent to a set of admissible rules and assumption-free rules. The single-conclusion version of the property also holds; note that assumption-free single-conclusion rules are just axioms.
As another application, we use canonical rules to develop the theory of modal companions of intuitionistic rule systems and consequence relations in Section 5. We show that the wellknown basic properties of modal companions of si logics (cf. [27, 3, 8, 36] ), including the Blok-Esakia theorem, generalize smoothly to rule systems.
In Section 6 we consider the generalization of canonical rules to nontransitive modal logics. While we cannot get any completeness theorem, we are at least able to define canonical rules so that they obey the expected refutation conditions (in contrast to canonical formulas). As an application of nontransitive canonical rules (actually, frame rules) we give a description of splittings in the lattices of rule systems or consequence relations extending a given rule system with the finite model property, which is an analogue of some classical results on the splittings in the lattice of normal modal logics (see e.g. [4, 28, 23] ). Our final application concerns the famous open problem of describing the admissible rules of the basic modal logic K. This problem is important both theoretically, as K is the simplest and most fundamental modal logic, yet its admissible rules are much harder to understand than for transitive logics like K4, and practically, as K and its multimodal variants are among the most often used modal logics in computer science. We characterize canonical rules admissible in K, and give a simple set of axioms from which they are derivable. (We do not obtain any general result on admissibility of rules in K though, as canonical rules are incomplete for nontransitive rule systems.)
Preliminaries
Given a finite set C of propositional connectives, let Form C be the set of propositional formulas built using connectives from C and countably many propositional variables p n , n < ω. A substitution is a mapping of propositional formulas to propositional formulas which commutes with connectives. A single-conclusion rule is an expression of the form Γ / ϕ, where Γ is a finite subset of Form C , and ϕ ∈ Form C . We will usually write Γ, ∆ for Γ ∪ ∆, and omit curly brackets around sets of formulas. A set A of single-conclusion rules is a (structural finitary) consequence relation (see e.g. [25] ), if it satisfies the following conditions for all formulas ϕ, ψ, finite sets of formulas Γ, Γ , and substitutions σ:
If A is a consequence relation, we denote by Ext 1 A the complete lattice of all consequence relations extending A.
A (multiple-conclusion) rule is an expression of the form Γ / ∆, where Γ and ∆ are finite sets of formulas. The intuitive meaning of Γ / ∆ is that if all formulas from Γ hold true, then some formula from ∆ also holds true (for whatever meaning of "hold true" appropriate in a given context). If = Γ / ∆, we call a := Γ its set of assumptions, and c := ∆ its set of conclusions. Thus a rule is single-conclusion iff | c | = 1. A rule is assumption-free if a = ∅. Assumption-free single-conclusion rules are called axioms or theorems, and are identified with formulas. We will sometimes write Γ ∆ instead of Γ / ∆. A set A of rules is a rule system, if it satisfies the following conditions for all formulas ϕ, finite sets of formulas Γ, ∆, Γ , ∆ , and substitutions σ:
A set X of rules entails or derives a rule , written as X , if belongs to the smallest rule system A containing X. We also say that X is a basis of A, and that A is axiomatized by X.
Given a rule system A, a rule system over A is a rule system A ⊇ A. The complete lattice of all rule systems over A is denoted by Ext m A. If X is a set of rules, then A + X is the smallest rule system over A which contains X. The set X is called a basis of A + X over A, and A+X is axiomatized over A by X. If X consists of assumption-free (or single-conclusion) rules, we will call A + X an assumption-free (single-conclusion, resp.) rule system over A.
If A is a consequence relation, then
is a rule system. Conversely, for any rule system A, the set A 1 of single-conclusion rules in A is a consequence relation. Moreover, (A m ) 1 = A for any consequence relation A, and (A 1 ) m = A for any rule system axiomatized by single-conclusion rules. We will therefore identify consequence relations with single-conclusion rule systems. We assume that the reader is familiar with the theory of modal and superintuitionistic logics. However, we introduce some of the basic notions below to fix the notation, and to adapt it to the context of multiple-conclusion rule systems. We refer the reader to [6] for concepts unexplained here.
A normal modal logic is a rule system using the connectives M = {→, ⊥, 2}, axiomatized by the modus ponens and necessitation rules
and a set of axioms which includes classical propositional tautologies, and the axiom
(I.e., we identify a normal modal logic with what is usually called its global consequence relation, as opposed to the local consequence relation, which does not include the necessitation rule.) If L is a logic, we will also write Γ L ϕ instead of Γ / ϕ ∈ L. The smallest normal modal logic is denoted by K. Rule systems over K are called normal modal rule systems. We may sometimes omit the qualifier "normal". A quasinormal modal logic is a rule system axiomatized by MP , and a set of axioms which includes all theorems of K. If A is a rule system over K, let qA be the largest quasinormal logic contained in A.
Notice that as a consequence of these definitions, for any normal modal logic L and a set of formulas X, we denote by L + X the normal closure of L and X (usually denoted by L⊕X), whereas we denote the quasinormal closure of L and X (usually denoted by L+X) by qL + X. We decided for this incompatibility with common usage because the ⊕/+ distinction does not seem to have a natural generalization to the context of rule systems.
We define other Boolean connectives as abbreviations in the obvious way. The symbols 3ϕ, · 2ϕ, · 3ϕ, 2 n ϕ, and 2 ≤n ϕ, are respectively abbreviations for ¬2¬ϕ, ϕ ∧ 2ϕ, ϕ ∨ 3ϕ, 2 · · · 2 n ϕ, and k≤n 2 k ϕ.
A superintuitionistic (si ) or intermediate logic is a rule system using the connectives I = {→, ∧, ∨, ⊥}, axiomatized by MP , and a set of axioms including all theorems of intuitionistic propositional logic (IPC ). Rule systems over IPC are called intuitionistic rule systems. Rule systems over
or over IPC are called transitive rule systems. Let L be a logic. A substitution σ is an L-unifier of a formula ϕ, if σϕ ∈ L. A rule Γ / ∆ is L-admissible, if every common L-unifier of the formulas in Γ is also an L-unifier of some formula in ∆. The set of all L-admissible rules forms a rule system over L, which we denote
A modal Kripke frame is a pair W, R , where R is a binary relation on a set W (which may be empty). We will most often work with transitive frames. In that case we will usually denote the accessibility relation R by the ordering symbol <, and its reflexive closure by ≤. (The notation < does not imply that the relation is irreflexive. In particular, if the accessibility relation is already reflexive, then < = ≤.) For any X ⊆ W , we define
where R * is the transitive reflexive closure of R. We will abbreviate {x}↑ as x↑. A modal frame is a triple W, R, P , where W, R is a Kripke frame, and P ⊆ P(W ) is closed under (finitary) Boolean operations, and the ↓ operation (or the operation 2X = W (W X)↓). We will often denote the frame W, R, P by just W if there is no danger of confusion. A Kripke frame W, R may be identified with the frame W, R, P(W ) . An admissible valuation is a relation ⊆ W × Form M which satisfies
x 2ϕ iff ∀y ∈ x↑ y ϕ,
for every x ∈ W , ϕ, ψ ∈ Form M , and every variable p. We will abbreviate the last condition as ∈ P ; it implies (ϕ) ∈ P for all formulas ϕ. A Kripke model is a pair W, , where W is a Kripke frame, and is a valuation in W . An intuitionistic Kripke frame is a partially ordered set W, ≤ . An intuitionistic frame is a triple W, ≤, P , where W, ≤ is a poset, and P is a set of upper subsets of W , closed under monotone Boolean operations, and the operation
Admissible valuations are relations ⊆ W × Form I such that ∈ P , and x ϕ → ψ iff ∀y ∈ x↑ (y ϕ ⇒ y ψ), x ϕ ∧ ψ iff x ϕ and x ψ,
for every x ∈ W , and ϕ, ψ ∈ Form I .
Let W, R, P be a modal or intuitionistic frame. A formula ϕ is satisfied by a valuation , if x ϕ for every x ∈ W . A rule Γ / ∆ is satisfied by , if some formula ψ ∈ ∆ is satisfied by , or some ϕ ∈ Γ is not satisfied by . A rule is valid in W, R, P , written as W , if it is satisfied by all admissible valuations ∈ P . A rule which is not valid in W is said to be refuted in W . If A is a rule system, then W is called an A-frame if A (i.e., every rule from A) is valid in W .
If C is a class of frames, then Th(C), Th m (C), and Th 1 (C) are the sets of formulas, multipleconclusion rules, and single-conclusion rules (respectively) valid in all frames W ∈ C. A rule system A is Kripke complete, if A = Th m (C) for a class C of Kripke frames, and it has the finite model property (fmp), if A = Th m (C) for a class of finite (Kripke, w.l.o.g.) frames. Notice that a nontransitive logic may fail to have fmp as a rule system even though it has fmp as a logic.
A pointed frame is a quadruple W, R, P, x , where W, R, P is a modal frame, and x ∈ W . A formula is valid in W, R, P, x , if x ϕ for every admissible valuation .
A frame V, S, Q is a generated subframe of a frame W, R, P , if V ⊆ W , V ↑ ⊆ V , S = R V , and Q = {A ∩ V | A ∈ P }. We will denote generated subframes by V ⊆· W . The frame W is generated by X ⊆ W , if W = X↑ (i.e., if W is the only generated subframe of itself which includes X.) If X = {x}, the frame W is rooted, and x is its root. If * ∈ {•, •}, we define W * , R * , P * as the frame obtained from W by attaching a new root r below W , such that r is reflexive if * = • and irreflexive if
Let W, < be a transitive Kripke frame. We put x ∼ y iff x ≤ y ≤ x. Equivalence classes of ∼ are called clusters, and we denote the cluster of a point x by cl(x). A cluster is proper if it has at least two points. Notice that every proper cluster is reflexive (i.e., all its points are). A cluster is final if it is a generated subframe of W . Dually, a cluster c is initial, if c↓ ⊆ c. An irreflexive final cluster (i.e., a point x such that x↑ = ∅) is called a dead end.
The disjoint union i W i of frames W i , R i , P i , i ∈ I, is the frame W, R, P defined as follows. We replace W i with their isomorphic copies so that they are disjoint, and put W = i W i , R = i R i , and P = {A ⊆ W | ∀i ∈ I A ∩ W i ∈ P i }. (On the other hand, we will denote disjoint union of sets by X∪ Y .)
An onto mapping f : W → V is a p-morphism of W, R, P to V, S, Q , if
(ii) if f (x) S u, there exists y ∈ W such that x R y and f (y) = u,
for every x, y ∈ W , u ∈ V , and A ∈ Q. A modal frame W, R, P is refined if
for all x, y ∈ F . An intuitionistic frame W, ≤, P is refined if
A frame is compact if every subset of P (resp. P ∪ {W A | A ∈ P } in the intuitionistic case) with the finite intersection property (fip) has a nonempty intersection. A compact refined frame is called descriptive.
A modal algebra A, ⇒, 0, 2 is a Boolean algebra A, ⇒, 0 with an additional unary operator 2 which distributes over finite meets. A valuation v (i.e., a homomorphism of Form M to A) satisfies a rule , if v(ϕ) = 1 for some ϕ ∈ a , or v(ψ) = 1 for some ψ ∈ c . A rule is valid in A, if it is satisfied by every valuation in A. If W, R, P is a modal frame, then its dual is the modal algebra P, →, ∅, 2 . A frame is finitely generated, or κ-generated for a cardinal κ, if its dual is. The intuitionistic case is analogous, using Heyting algebras in place of modal algebras.
We end this section with basic completeness and preservation results about rule systems. Proof: For any subsets Γ ⊆ a and ∆ ⊆ c , the rule Γ / ∆ is not in A, by weakening. By Zorn's lemma, there exists a pair x, y of maximal sets of formulas such that a ⊆ x, c ⊆ y, and Γ / ∆ ∈ A for no finite Γ ⊆ x, ∆ ⊆ y. Clearly x ∩ y = ∅. On the other hand, x ∪ y contains all formulas, as A is closed under cut. It follows that x is closed under all rules from A; i.e., if Γ / ∆ ∈ A and Γ ⊆ x, then ∆ ∩ x = ∅. Let C, R, P be the canonical L-frame, and W := {u ∈ C | u ⊇ x}. W is a generated subframe of C: in the intuitionistic case it is obvious from the definition, in the modal case it follows as x is closed under necessitation. As such, W is a refined L-frame, and it is easy to see that it is compact as well.
An admissible valuation in W , given by a substitution σ, satisfies a formula ϕ iff σϕ ∈ x: the right-to-left implication is obvious. If σϕ / ∈ x, the set x ∪ {¬σϕ} is L-consistent, as A includes L. Therefore there exists an L-MCS u ⊇ x such that σϕ / ∈ u, which means that u ∈ W , and u ϕ. (The intuitionistic case is similar.) Consequently, all rules from A are valid in W as A is closed under substitution, but is refuted by the valuation given by the identity substitution.
2 Proposition 2.3 Let A be a modal or intuitionistic rule system.
(i ) A is valid in a frame iff it is valid in its dual algebra.
(ii ) Validity of A is preserved by p-morphisms.
Proof: (i) It is clear from the definition that validity of rules in a frame depends only on its algebra of admissible sets.
(ii) Let f be a p-morphism of W A onto U , ∈ A, and let U be an admissible valuation in U . As f is a p-morphism, there exists an admissible valuation W in W such that W (ϕ) = f −1 [ U (ϕ)] for every formula ϕ. If U satisfies a in U , then W satisfies a in W , hence it also satisfies some ψ ∈ c , thus ψ is satisfied by U .
2 Proposition 2.4 Let A be a modal or intuitionistic rule system. The following are equivalent.
(i ) Validity of A is preserved under disjoint unions.
(ii ) A has a single-conclusion basis.
(iii ) For any rule ∈ A, there is ψ ∈ c such that a / ψ ∈ A.
, and put W = i∈I W i . Let ∈ A be a singleconclusion rule, and an admissible valuation in W which satisfies a . For each i ∈ I, the restriction of to W i is an admissible valuation which satisfies a in W i , hence it also satisfies c . It follows that satisfies c in W .
(i) → (iii): Assume that A is preserved under disjoint unions, and let be such that ψ := a / ψ ∈ A for no ψ ∈ c . We may fix frames W ψ validating A and refuting ψ by a valuation ψ for each ψ ∈ c . Then the disjoint union W = ψ W ψ validates A and refutes by the valuation ψ ψ , thus / ∈ A. 2 Proposition 2.5 Let A be a modal or intuitionistic rule system. The following are equivalent.
(i ) Validity of A is preserved by generated subframes.
(ii ) A has an assumption-free basis over K or IPC .
(iii ) For any rule , ∈ A implies / {ϕ → ψ | ψ ∈ c } ∈ A, where ϕ = a in the intuitionistic case, and ϕ = 2 ≤n a for some n ∈ ω in the modal case. (If A is transitive modal, we can take n = 1.)
(ii) → (i): Let W A, U ⊆· W , an admissible valuation in U , and ∈ A an assumptionfree rule. We can extend to an admissible valuation in W . As satisfies some ψ ∈ c in W , it also satisfies ψ in U .
(i) → (iii): Assume that A is preserved by generated subframes, and / {ϕ n → ψ | ψ ∈ c } / ∈ A for every n, where ϕ n = 2 ≤n a . As K ϕ n → ϕ n+1 , we have / ∆ / ∈ A for every finite subset ∆ of S := {ϕ n → ψ | n ∈ ω, ψ ∈ c }. By the proof of Theorem 2.2, there exists a descriptive frame W, R, P such that W A, and a valuation in W which refutes all formulas in S. For every ψ ∈ c , the set
has fip, hence there exists x ψ ∈ P ψ . Then x ψ ψ, and y a for every y ∈ x↑. Let U = {x ψ | ψ ∈ c }↑. Then U , as a generated subframe of W , validates A, but refutes by the valuation . The intuitionistic case is similar. 2
Canonical rules
In this section we will introduce our canonical rules (including their single-conclusion variants) as well as their refutation criteria, and prove their completeness for transitive rule systems, and some basic properties. We will discuss Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas along the way. All frames in this section are assumed to be transitive.
Definition 3.1 Let W, <, P be a modal frame, and F, < a finite Kripke frame. A partial mapping f from W onto F is a subreduction of W to F , if for all x, y ∈ W and u ∈ F ,
(ii) if f (x) < u, there exists y ∈ dom(f ) such that x < y and f (y) = u,
Subreductions of intuitionistic frames are defined in a similar way, except that the last condition is replaced with
We say that f is globally cofinal, if it satisfies GCDC for the empty domain, i.e.,
Definition 3.2 Let F, < be a finite Kripke frame, and D a set of domains in F . The modal canonical rule γ(F, D) in variables {p i | i ∈ F } is defined as
where i, j range over elements of F . If F is an intuitionistic frame, the intuitionistic canonical
where i, j ∈ F , and D is the set of domains d ∈ D which are not rooted.
Lemma 3.3 A modal (resp., intuitionistic) frame W, <, P refutes γ(F, D) (resp., δ(F, D)) iff there is a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D.
Proof: Let W, <, P be a modal frame. Valuations to the variables {p i | i ∈ F } in the underlying Kripke frame W, < are in 1-1 correspondence to relations f ⊆ W × F , using
Then we observe that
• p i ∨ p j is satisfied by for all i = j iff f is a partial function,
• 2p j → p i is satisfied for all i < j iff f satisfies condition (ii),
Hence refutes γ(F, D) if and only if f is a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D.
In the intuitionistic case, we define a subreduction from a valuation refuting δ(F, D) by
Conversely, given a subreduction, we can refute δ(F, D) by the valuation defined by
Details are left to the reader. 2
We define Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas and their refutation criteria below. We will only need canonical formulas for quasinormal extensions of qK4, but we also include canonical formulas axiomatizing normal extensions of K4 and si logics, for comparison with canonical rules.
Definition 3.4 Let W, <, P, r be a pointed frame, and F a finite rooted Kripke frame with root 0 ∈ F .
If the root 0 of F is irreflexive, a quasisubreduction of W to F is a partial mapping from F onto W , which satisfies the conditions (ii) and (iii) from Definition 3.1, and for every x, y ∈ W , (i') x < y and x, y ∈ dom(f ) implies f (x) < f (y) or f (x) = f (y) = 0.
A subreduction or quasisubreduction f of W to F satisfies the actual world condition
where i, j range over elements of F . If 0 is irreflexive, the quasinormal canonical formula
where i, j ∈ F , and D is the set of domains d ∈ D which are not rooted. In other words,
Lemma 3.5 (Zakharyaschev [37] ) Let F be a finite rooted Kripke frame, and D a set of domains in F .
(i ) A modal frame W refutes the canonical formula α(F, D) iff there is a subreduction of W to F with LCDC for D.
(ii ) If F is intuitionistic, then an intuitionistic frame W refutes β(F, D) iff there is a subreduction of W to F with LCDC for D.
(iii ) A pointed modal frame W, r refutes α(F, D) iff there is a subreduction of W to F with AWC and LCDC for D.
If the root of F is irreflexive, then W, r refutes α • (F, D) iff there is a quasisubreduction of W to F with AWC and LCDC for D.
2 Theorem 3.6 (Zakharyaschev [37] )
there is a finite set ∆ of normal canonical formulas such that K4 + ϕ = K4 + ∆.
(ii ) For any ϕ ∈ Form I , there is a finite set ∆ of intuitionistic canonical formulas such that IPC + ϕ = IPC + ∆.
(iii ) For any ϕ ∈ Form M , there is a finite set ∆ of normal and quasinormal canonical formulas such that qK4 + ϕ = qK4 + ∆.
we may assume that ∅ ∈ D, F / ∈ D, and no d ∈ D is generated by a reflexive point. There is an algorithm which, given ϕ, computes a suitable ∆.
2 Remark 3.7 We have deviated from the original Zakharyaschev's presentation of canonical formulas in several details. We define domains as upper subsets of F , whereas Zakharyaschev uses antichains; we prefer the former as distinct antichains may generate the same subset of F (thus giving equivalent canonical formulas). We do not formally distinguish negationfree canonical formulas α(F, D) from the "regular" canonical formulas α(F, D, ⊥), as the latter is syntactically and semantically equivalent to the special case α(F, D ∪ {∅}) of the former, using the empty domain (or antichain). (Zakharyaschev apparently does not allow empty antichains in α(F, D), though we failed to find it stated explicitly in [37, 6] .) We renamed Zakharyaschev's closed domain condition to local closed domain condition, as we also consider the global version thereof needed for canonical rules. (We actually find the global closed domain condition to be the more natural and more fundamental of the two, but we did not go so far as to call GCDC just "closed domain condition" to avoid confusion.)
The main result of this section is the completeness theorem below. We will split its proof into a few lemmas. The basic idea is to embed modal rule systems in quasinormal logics, use Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas for quasinormal extensions of qK4, and reduce intuitionistic rule systems to modal ones by Gödel's translation. (ii ) If is an intuitionistic rule, there is a finite set ∆ of intuitionistic canonical rules such that IPC + = IPC + ∆.
Moreover, for each γ(F, D) or δ(F, D) in ∆, we may require that ∅ ∈ D, and no d ∈ D is generated by a reflexive point. There is an algorithm which, given , computes a suitable ∆.
Definition 3.9
The characteristic formula of a modal rule is
Recall the definition of W • . Notice that the pointed frame W • , r , where r is the root of 
Proof:
is a rule system for any quasinormal logic L. Assume that / ∈ K4 + R. By Theorem 2.2, there is a frame W, <, P which validates R and refutes . Then the pointed frame W • , r validates qK4 + χ[R], and refutes χ( ). 2 Lemma 3.11 Let W, <, P be a frame, r the root of W • , F a finite Kripke frame, and D a set of domains in F .
Proof: We only indicate how to construct the (quasi)subreductions, leaving the details to the reader. Right-to-left: given a subreduction f of W to F , we extend it to W • by mapping r to the root of F or F • (as appropriate) in cases (i)-(iii). In case (iv), we map all points x such that 
If W, ≤, P is an intuitionistic frame, let σW be the modal frame W, ≤, σP , where σP is the Boolean closure of P . If W, ≤, P is a reflexive transitive (i.e., preordered) modal frame, its skeleton W is the intuitionistic frame W/∼, ≤/∼, P (i.e., the points of W are the clusters of W ), where
Recall that for any intuitionistic frame W , we have W σW , and σW
Lemma 3.13 Let W be a preordered frame, π an intuitionistic rule, F a finite intuitionistic Kripke frame, and D a set of domains in F .
Proof: (i) On the one hand, assume W Tπ, and let W ∈ P . There exists a valuation
for every variable p, and x ∈ W . Then
for every ϕ ∈ Form I by induction on its complexity (see [6, §8.3] ), hence the validity of Tπ in W implies that π is satisfied by W . On the other hand, let W π, and W ∈ P . There exits a valuation W ∈ P such that cl(x) W p ⇔ x W 2p. Then again ( * ) holds, hence Tπ is satisfied by W .
(ii) On the one hand, let f be a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D, and define a partial function g : W → F by
, whence it is easy to see that g is a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D.
On the other hand, let g be a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D. Notice that g(x) = g(y) for every x, y ∈ dom(g) such that x ∼ y. We define a partial function f :
, thus it is easy to see that f is a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D.
2
Proof (of Theorem 3.8): Consider the modal case first. Let
we need to show A = K4 + . Clearly, A ⊆ K4 + . Assume for contradiction that / ∈ A, and let W be a frame validating A but refuting , which exists by Theorem 2.2. Then the pointed frame W • , r validates χ[A] and refutes χ( ). By Theorem 3.6, there exists a normal or quasinormal canonical formula α ∈ qK4 + χ( ) which is refuted in W • , r . Let γ be the corresponding canonical rule as in Lemma 3.11. Then W refutes γ, thus γ / ∈ A, and by the definition of A, γ / ∈ K4 + . By Theorem 2.2, there is a frame U validating , and refuting γ. Then U • , r validates χ( ) and refutes α, which contradicts α ∈ qK4 + χ( ).
The intuitionistic case can be reduced to the modal case as follows. Let
For any intuitionistic frame W , we have
where the first and last equivalence come from Lemma 3.13, and the second one from completeness of modal canonical rules which we have just established, using the fact that canonical rules γ(F, D) which are not based on an intuitionistic frame (i.e., F contains an irreflexive point or a proper cluster) are valid in σW . Thus, by Theorem 2.2, IPC + = IPC + A.
We have shown that any rule is equivalent to a set R of canonical rules. By definition, this means that is derivable from R and finitely many initial rules using substitution, cut, and weakening. As such a derivation is finitary, we may assume R to be finite. Moreover, the derivation is checkable by an algorithm, thus the set of pairs , R such that R is a finite sequence of canonical rules equivalent to is recursively enumerable. As every total r.e. relation contains a graph of a recursive function, we can compute one such R from . (Alternatively, we may construct an algorithm using the effectiveness of Theorem 3.6 and Lemma 3.11.) 2
Most results below have a modal version and an intuitionistic version. Often the proofs of both are essentially identical, except that we have to replace γ(F, D), α(F, D) with δ(F, D), β(F, D), and omit · 2's. In such cases we will generally skip details of the proof of the intuitionistic part to avoid unnecessary cluttering of the text.
Theorem 3.8 implies that domains generated by a reflexive cluster are redundant. In more detail, we have the following. Proof: Let f be a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D, and r a generator of d. Put
for any x ∈ W , and it is easy to see that g is a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D ∪ {d}. 2 Definition 3.15 We introduce shorthand notation for some common types of canonical rules by analogy with Zakharyaschev's notation for canonical formulas. We put γ(F, D, ⊥) := γ(F, D ∪ {∅}). We define the subframe rules γ(F ) := γ(F, ∅), the cofinal-subframe rules γ(F, ⊥) := γ(F, {∅}), the frame rules γ (F, ⊥) := γ(F, F ), and the dense-subframe rules γ (F ) := γ(F, F {∅}), where F is the set of all domains in F . The intuitionistic variants δ(F ), δ(F, ⊥), δ (F ), δ (F, ⊥) are defined similarly.
We will depict frames using • for irreflexive points, and • for reflexive points. We will write * as a shorthand when we intend to include both the reflexive and irreflexive version, for example
Definition 3.16 Let F, < be a finite Kripke frame, D a set of domains in F , and X ⊆ F . We define the restricted modal canonical rule
and if F is an intuitionistic frame, the restricted intuitionistic canonical rule
Lemma 3.17 Let γ(F, D, X) be a restricted modal canonical rule.
(i ) A frame W refutes γ(F, D, X) iff there is a subreduction of W to a generated subframe G of F with GCDC for D, such that X ⊆ G.
(
The same holds for intuitionistic rules with δ in place of γ.
Proof: (i) The proof of Lemma 3.3 shows that W γ(F, D, X) iff there exists a subreduction f into (not necessarily onto) F with GCDC for D, such that rng(f ) ⊇ X. By condition (ii) of Definition 3.1, G = rng(f ) is a generated subframe of F . Notice that it makes no difference whether we consider GCDC for D relative to F or G, as GCDC trivially holds for all domains d such that d G. Thus, f is a subreduction of W to G with GCDC for D G.
(ii) and (iii) follow from (i). The intuitionistic case is analogous. 2 Theorem 3.18 Let A be a rule system over K4. The following are equivalent.
(i ) A is equivalent to a set of single-conclusion rules.
(ii ) For any γ(F, D) ∈ A, F is nonempty, and whenever
(iii ) A is equivalent to a set of restricted canonical rules of the form γ(F, D, {i}), i ∈ F .
Moreover, we may require in (iii ) that D satisfies the conditions from Theorem 3.8, and i belongs to an initial cluster of F . The same holds for intuitionistic rules with δ in place of γ.
The empty frame validates all single-conclusion rules, and refutes γ(∅, D).
Assume that A γ(F α , D) for each α. Let f α be a subreduction of a frame W α A to F α with GCDC for D. Put W = W 1 + W 2 , and f = f 1 + f 2 . Then W A by Proposition 2.4, and f is a subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D, hence A γ(F, D).
(ii) → (iii): By Theorem 3.8, A is axiomatized by canonical rules γ(F, D). Let γ(F, D) ∈ A, it suffices to show that γ(F, D, {i}) ∈ A for some i ∈ F . Assume for contradiction that there is no such i. By Lemma 3.17, for each i there exists a generated subframe G i ⊆· F such that i ∈ G i , and A γ(G i , D G i ). As i G i = F , we obtain A γ(F, D) by repeated application of (ii), which is a contradiction.
The intuitionistic case is analogous. 2
Example 3.19
The introduction of restricted canonical rules is necessary, if we want to axiomatize consequence relations (single-conclusion rule systems) by single-conclusion rules: the set of single-conclusion canonical rules is not complete for such systems. First, notice that a canonical rule γ(F, D) is single-conclusion iff F is rooted (hint: if G F , the frame G separates γ(G, D G) from γ(F, D)). Consider the logic
viewed as a rule system. We claim that D4 γ(F, D) iff ∅ ∈ F and F contains a dead end.
On the one hand, if W cofinally subreduces to an F which contains a dead end, then W itself contains a dead end, thus W D4. On the other hand, if F contains no dead end, then F is a D4-frame refuting γ (F, D) ; if F contains a dead end and ∅ / ∈ D, we may put an extra reflexive point above F .
If F is a rooted frame with a dead end, and ∅ ∈ D, then γ(F, D) is valid in the two-element frame • •, which is not a D4-frame. Thus, D4 cannot be axiomatized by single-conclusion canonical rules.
Incidentally, we note that the above considerations show
Example 3.20 Canonical rules rely on certain phenomena, which a reader familiar with Zakharyaschev's canonical formulas may find surprising. Apart from the fact (discussed above) that frames are no longer rooted, we have rules γ(F, D) where F is empty, or where F ∈ D. Both are essential, as we explain below. There are two canonical rules based on the empty frame, viz.
= γ(∅),
The first one generates the inconsistent rule system, and by Theorem 3.8, it is redundant: we can express it e.g. as
On the other hand, the consistency rule 2 Con, which is valid in a frame W iff W is nonempty, cannot be written as a combination of other canonical rules, as it is the only consistent canonical rule with empty conclusion. Such a rule cannot be derived from any set of rules with nonempty conclusions. However, if we intend to deal only with rules with nonempty conclusions, we can dispense with γ(∅, ⊥). Rules γ(F, D) where F ∈ D can express "downwards unboundedness" conditions. As an example, the unboxing rule is valid in a Kripke frame W iff every irreflexive point x ∈ W has a predecessor. We cannot express Unb using only canonical rules γ(F, D) such that F / ∈ D. In fact, no such rule is derivable from Unb: the frame F • validates Unb, and refutes γ(F, D).
Another interesting example is the weak disjunction property rule
which is valid in a Kripke frame W, < iff ≤ is downwards directed (i.e., every pair of points has a lower bound). The full disjunction property rule system axiomatized by
can be written as
Example 3.21 Some of the simplest canonical rules are listed in Table 1 . For a more complicated example, the Kreisel-Putnam rule can be expressed as
6 , {∅, d}) + δ(
6 , {∅, d}).
Every intermediate logic or normal extension of K4 is a rule system, and thus can be axiomatized by canonical rules. In general, we know of no simple method to convert a canonical formula α(F, D) to a set of canonical rules. Roughly speaking, one has to consider variants of γ (F, D) where extra points are inserted in "harmless" places in F . However, cofinal-subframe logics can be axiomatized by cofinal-subframe canonical rules in an easy way. We first check that Zakharyaschev's proof of the finite model property for cofinal-subframe logics [38] carries on to rule systems. Lemma 3.22 A transitive rule system axiomatized by subframe and cofinal-subframe canonical rules has the finite model property.
Proof: Let A be the rule system, and assume that / ∈ A. By Theorem 3.8, there exists a canonical rule π = γ(F, D) (or δ (F, D) , in the intuitionistic case) such that ∅ ∈ D, π, and π / ∈ A. The latter implies that there exists a frame W A, and a globally cofinal (i.e., with GCDC for ∅ ∈ D) subreduction f of W to F . As F , it suffices to show that F A. Let σ = γ(G, E) ∈ A, where E = ∅ or E = {∅}. If we assume for contradiction that F σ, there exists a (globally cofinal if E = ∅) subreduction g of F to G. Then g • f is a (globally cofinal if appropriate) subreduction of W to G, hence W σ, a contradiction. 2
Lemma 3.23 Let L be a transitive logic. If L has the finite model property as a logic, then it also has the finite model property as a rule system. 
Moreover, we may omit the extra • or • in (iii ) if F has an irreflexive or reflexive final singleton cluster.
Proof: (i) is obvious from the refutation criteria.
(ii), (iii): By Lemmas 3.22 and 3.23, it suffices to show that both sides have the same finite models. Given a locally cofinal subreduction of a finite frame to F , we extend it to a globally cofinal subreduction to F • • by mapping all final clusters to a final singleton cluster, reflexive or irreflexive as needed. On the other hand, if f a globally cofinal subreduction to F • •, we pick a point x such that f (x) is the root of F , and we restrict f to x↑ to obtain a locally cofinal subreduction to F . 2
For example, apart from the above mentioned D4 = K4 + γ(• •, ⊥, {•}), we have
Admissible rules
We are going to apply canonical rules to the analysis of admissible rules in some well-known logics. The basic idea is that subreductions to frames with sufficiently many tight predecessors (see below) can be lifted up from a generated subframe, which implies that the corresponding canonical rule is assumption-free using Proposition 2.5. However, we begin with a few general observations on admissibility and derivability of canonical rules.
A si logic L derives δ(F, D) if and only if β(G, D G) ∈ L for some rooted generated subframe G of F .
Proof: Comparison of the refutation conditions shows immediately that
The following holds despite Example 3.19.
Proposition 4.2 A normal extension L of K4 is structurally complete if and only if for every rooted
A si logic L is structurally complete if and only if for every rooted
Proof: The left-to-right implication follows from Lemma 4.1. Assume that the RHS holds, and L admits a single-conclusion rule . By Theorem 3.18, we may assume = γ(F, D, {i}). Let G be the subframe of F generated by i, and D = D G. As L admits γ(G, D ), our assumption gives α(G, D ) ∈ L, hence L derives by Lemma 4.1.
The intuitionistic case is analogous. 2 Definition 4.3 A transitive logic L has the rule dichotomy property, if every rule is over L equivalent to a set of rules which are either L-admissible or assumption-free. L has the single-conclusion rule dichotomy property, if every single-conclusion rule is over L equivalent to a set of single-conclusion rules which are either L-admissible or assumptionfree (i.e., formulas).
L has the strong rule dichotomy property, if every canonical rule is L-admissible or equivalent over L to an assumption-free rule.
L has the strong single-conclusion rule dichotomy property, if every restricted canonical rule γ(F, D, {i}) (or δ(F, D, {i}) in the intuitionistic case) is L-admissible or equivalent over L to a formula.
Observation 4.4
If L has the strong (single-conclusion) rule dichotomy property, then it has the (single-conclusion) rule dichotomy property.
If L has the (strong) rule dichotomy property, and M inherits L-admissible rules, then M has the (strong) rule dichotomy property.
If L has the (strong) single-conclusion rule dichotomy, and M inherits L-admissible singleconclusion rules, then M has the (strong) single-conclusion rule dichotomy. 2
Corollary 4.5 If L has the (single-conclusion) rule dichotomy property, and M ⊇ L, then (single-conclusion) M -admissible rules have a basis consisting of rules admissible in both L and M .
Proof: M -admissible assumption-free rules are M -derivable, thus redundant in a basis. 2 Proposition 4.6 If a logic L has the strong rule dichotomy property, then it has the singleconclusion rule dichotomy property. In more detail, if is a single-conclusion rule, there exists a formula ϕ, and restricted canonical
and i ∈ | ∼ L for every i < k.
we are done. Otherwise Lemma 3.17 implies that there exists a G ⊆· F such that α ∈ G, and π := γ(G, D G) is assumption-free over L. We have
by Proposition 2.5. As π ∈ L + by Lemma 3.17, we obtain L + ϕ := ( · 2π a → ψ) for some ψ ∈ π c by Proposition 2.4. We have L + ϕ γ(F, D) by Lemma 4.1.
The intuitionistic case is analogous. 2 Remark 4.7 It is not clear whether we can weaken the assumption of Proposition 4.6 to the rule dichotomy property, or whether we can strengthen the conclusion to the strong single-conclusion dichotomy property. The rule dichotomy property, specifically Corollary 4.5, generalizes a property noticed by Iemhoff [15] , which states that Visser's rules (i.e., a basis of admissible rules of IPC ) are a basis of admissible rules for any si logic where they are admissible. This follows easily from the characterization of admissibility in terms of projective formulas, using the fact that projectivity is preserved in extensions (thus it also holds for modal logics where the projectivity-based characterization works, see [18] ). Corollary 4.5 shows that a similar property holds even for extensions which do not inherit the admissible rules of the base logic.
We are going to establish rule dichotomy for several basic modal logics as well as intuitionistic logic. We obtain for free an alternative proof of decidability of admissibility in these logics (originally due to Rybakov, see [29] ), and an explicit description of bases (after Iemhoff [14] and Jeřábek [18, 21] ). We first introduce some concepts from [14, 18] . 
where n, m ∈ ω. Let A •,1 and A •,1 be the restrictions of A • and A • to n ≤ 1.
Let W, < be a Kripke frame, and X ⊆ W . A point t ∈ W is an irreflexive tight predecessor (•-tp) of X, if t↑ = X↑, and it is a reflexive tight predecessor (•-tp) of X, if t↑ = {t} ∪ X↑. (Notice that if X is generated by a reflexive point r, then r is both a •-tp and an •-tp of X; in particular, irreflexive tight predecessors do not have to be irreflexive points.)
Notice that a subframe logic L derives the rule γ(F, D) iff F L.
Theorem 4.9
If L is one of the logics IPC , K4, GL, S4, K4.3, S4.3, or GL.3, then L has the strong rule dichotomy property. In more detail, the following are equivalent for modal L.
(iii ) γ(F, D) is derivable in the rule system axiomatized over L by the rules given in Table 2 . (iii) → (ii): Let * ∈ {•, •} be an L-frame, and n ∈ ω be such that n ≤ 1 if L ⊇ K4.3. Consider a substitution σ such that L σ( · 2q → p i ) for each i < n. Fix finite rooted Kripke L-models W i , x i σ( · 2q ∧ ¬p i ), and put W = ( i W i ) * , with r being its root. Then W L, W, r σ 2q ∧ i ¬2p i if * = •, and W, r σ · 2(q ↔ 2q) ∧ i ¬2p i if * = •. The intuitionistic case is similar.
(iv) → (iii): Let A be the rule system from Table 2 , and assume that there exists a frame W L + A, and a subreduction f of W to F with GCDC for D. Clearly F L, as L is a subframe logic. Let d ∈ D, and * ∈ {•, •} be such that d * L, we will show that d has a * -tp 
By the definition of , we obtain
If * = •, let S be a selector on the clusters of F , and define
If f (x) = i / ∈ d, let j ≥ i be in a maximal cluster such that j / ∈ d, and w.l.o.g. j ∈ S. Then y q for any y ≥ x such that f (y) = j. It follows that
, which implies x 2q and x q. The latter implies x ∈ dom(f ), thus let i = f (x). We have i / ∈ d, thus let j ≥ i be in a maximal cluster such that j / ∈ d, and j ∈ S. If j = i, we have x q, a contradiction. Thus j = i, which means that i↑ = d ∪ cl(i). If i is irreflexive, then x 2q, a contradiction. If cl(i) is proper, then y q ∧ ¬2q for any y > x such that f (y) ∈ cl(i) {i}. Hence cl(i) is a reflexive singleton, which means that i is a •-tp of d.
In the intuitionistic case, we consider W V , a subreduction f of W to F with GCDC for D, d ∈ D, and the valuation such that ( F, D) . We will show that γ(F, D) is assumption-free over L using the criterion of Proposition 2.5. Assume that W L, U ⊆· W , and f is a subreduction of U to F with GCDC for D, we want to extend f to W . We may assume w.l.o.g. that no d ∈ D is generated by a reflexive point. Let {d i | i < n} be an enumeration of D such that d i ⊆ d j only if i ≤ j. By induction on k ≤ n, we will construct a subreduction f k of W to F with GCDC for D k := {d i | i < k} such that f k U = f , and the corresponding valuation k on W refuting γ (F, D k ) . k = 0: Let 0 be a valuation in W such that
for every x ∈ U . Define
Then f 0 is a subreduction, and f = f 0 U as (γ(F )) a is valid in U under . k → k + 1: Let t be an •-tp of d k in F if one exists, otherwise we adjoin a new point t to F which makes an •-tp of d k , and extend k to make p t true everywhere in W . Let s be a •-tp of d k constructed in a similar way. As d k does not have a reflexive root, we have t, s / ∈ d k , and t s t. Put F + = F ∪ {t, s},
we must have rng(f k+1 ) ⊆ F , and we may forget about the extra points. For any x ∈ W , f k+1 coincides with f k on x↑ unless there exists y ≥ x such that y k p i and y k+1 p i , where i ∈ {t, s}. In particular, y k ϕ k , whence it is easy to see that y k+1 · 2(γ(F + )) a , and
In particular, f k+1 U = f k U = f , as f satisfies GCDC for D. As rng(f k ) = F , f k+1 is a subreduction to F . We need to show that f k+1 satisfies GCDC for D k+1 . Assume for contradiction that x / ∈ dom(f k+1 ), and f k+1 [x↑] = d i for some x ∈ W , and i ≤ k.
In the intuitionistic case, we take 0 such that 0 (p i ) ∩ U = U f −1 [i]↓, and define
In the step from k to k + 1, we take s to be a •-tp of d k , and define
Verification of the properties of f k is then analogous to the modal case. 2
We formulated Theorem 4.9 for seven basic logics for convenience, nevertheless Observation 4.4 immediately gives a generalization to all so-called extensible and linear extensible logics [18, 19] (including, e.g., Grz , S4.1, and all extensions of S4.3): Corollary 4.10 If a logic L inherits multiple-conclusion rules admissible in L 0 = IPC , K4, GL, S4, K4.3, S4.3, or GL.3, then L has the strong rule dichotomy property, and a recursive basis of admissible multiple-conclusion rules consisting of the basis for L 0 from Table 2. 2 It is easy to see from the definition that admissibility in any decidable logic L is Π 0 1 . If furthermore L has a Σ 0 1 basis of admissible rules, then admissibility in L is Σ 0 1 , hence it is decidable. Thus admissibility of multiple-conclusion rules in decidable logics L meeting the assumption of Corollary 4.10 is decidable. We can give a more concrete algorithm as follows. Given a rule , we first compute a set of canonical rules {γ(
By Lemma 4.1, the latter is equivalent to L α(G, D i G) for some rooted generated subframe G of F i , which we can check using a decision algorithm for L. However, this algorithm is only of theoretical interest because of its prohibitive complexity: already the first step (expressing in terms of canonical rules) is nonelementary.
The above mentioned logics have the single-conclusion rule dichotomy property by Proposition 4.6. We can do better by a direct proof:
11 If a logic L inherits single-conclusion admissible rules of IPC , K4, GL, S4, K4.3, S4.3, or GL.3, then L has the strong single-conclusion rule dichotomy property.
Proof: By Observation 4.4, we may assume L to be one of the seven basic systems named in the theorem. We will concentrate on the modal cases, the intuitionistic case is analogous.
Consider a restricted canonical rule γ (F, D, {i}) . If all the rules γ(G, D G) such that i ∈ G ⊆· F are L-admissible, then γ(F, D, {i}) is also L-admissible. Otherwise there exists a G such that i ∈ G ⊆· F , and γ(G, D G) is assumption-free over L, and nonderivable in L. Fix an L-frame V , and a subreduction g of V to G with GCDC for D. We will show that γ(F, D, {i}) is assumption-free over L, using Proposition 2.5.
Let W be an L-frame, and U ⊆· W such that U γ(F, D, {i}). Fix a subreduction f of U to H ⊆· F , i ∈ H, with GCDC for D. The restriction of f to
Similar to Corollary 4.10, we can extend the proof of Theorem 4.11 to provide explicit bases, which also implies decidability of admissibility of single-conclusion rules in decidable logics meeting the assumption of the theorem.
Notice that Corollary 4.10 and Theorem 4.11 cover the known analysis (constructions of explicit bases of admissible rules and proofs of decidability) of admissible rules following the strategy of projective formulas, as given in [14, 15, 16, 18] . The methods of Rybakov [29] show decidability of admissibility for a larger class of logics, however no bases of admissible rules are known for these logics. Just like with the projectivity-based approach, it is not clear whether we can generalize the analysis of admissibility based on canonical rules to a wider class of logics. Presumably more refined techniques might be needed, as the rule dichotomy is a very strong property which is unlikely to hold for a substantial class of logics.
Blok-Esakia isomorphism
In this section we investigate modal companions of intuitionistic rule systems. We will show that every rule system has the smallest and the largest modal companion (the latter being the former plus Grz ), we establish a Blok-Esakia isomorphism of Ext m IPC and Ext m Grz , and we describe the companion maps in terms of their frames, and their canonical form. Recall that the Grzegorczyk logic is
Definition 5.1 If A is a rule system over S4, we define
We say that A is a modal companion of A. If B is an intuitionistic rule system, we put τ B = S4 + {Tπ | π ∈ B}, σB = Grz + τ B. (ii ) If A is a rule system over S4, then τ A ⊆ A ⊆ σ A.
Proof: (i) B ⊆ τ B ⊆ σB is obvious. If π / ∈ B, there exists a frame W B such that W π, thus σW σB and σW Tπ by Lemma 3.13. Consequently Tπ / ∈ σB, thus π / ∈ σB. (ii) We have σB = B, and σ A = Grz + τ A ⊆ A ⊆ σ A by Lemma 5.4, whenever A ⊇ Grz . Thus σ and Ext m Grz are mutually inverse bijections. Being monotone, they are also order isomorphisms, hence lattice isomorphisms.
2 Theorem 5.6 Let {F i | i ∈ I} be a sequence of finite intuitionistic frames, {F i | i ∈ J} a sequence of finite transitive frames which are not intuitionistic frames, and {D i | i ∈ I ∪ J} an appropriate sequence of sets of domains. Then
On the other hand, the same Lemma implies
hence using Lemma 5.4, Lemma 5.3 . On the other hand,
by (i), and Lemma 5.4.
(iii) follows from (ii). 2 Definition 5.7 Let W, ≤, P be an intuitionistic frame, and 0 < k < ω. We define the modal frame τ k W = kW, k≤, kP , where kW = W × k, x, i k≤ y, j iff x ≤ y, and
Notice that τ 1 W σW , and W τ k W .
Lemma 5.8 If F is a finite preordered frame with clusters of size at most k < ω, and σW γ( F, D), then τ k W γ(F, D).
Proof: Let f be a subreduction of σW to F with GCDC for D. Enumerate (not necessarily injectively) each cluster c ∈ F as c = {u c,i | i < k}. Define a partial function g :
Then it is easy to see that g is a subreduction of τ k W to F with GCDC for D. 2 Theorem 5.9 Let C be a class of preordered frames, D a class of intuitionistic frames, A ∈ Ext m S4, and B ∈ Ext m IPC .
Proof: The inclusion ⊆ in all three cases follows from Lemma 3.13, using σW τ k W W . We will to show the other inclusion.
(i) If π / ∈ A, then Tπ / ∈ A, hence there exists W ∈ C such that W Tπ, thus W π by Lemma 3.13.
( 2
Remark 5.11 , τ , and σ map single-conclusion rule systems to single-conclusion rule systems, hence the results above also hold for Ext 1 in place of Ext m .
The nontransitive case
In this section, we take a look on the possibility of using canonical rules also in the context of nontransitive modal logics. We first observe that the definition of canonical rules and their basic properties readily generalize to K.
Definition 6.1 Let F, R be a finite Kripke frame, D a set of arbitrary subsets of F , and X a subset of F . We define the canonical rules γ(F, D) and γ(F, D, X) as in Definitions 3.2 and 3.16.
Lemma 6.2 Let W be a frame. (ii ) W refutes γ(F, D, X) iff there exists a subreduction of W to a generated subframe G of F with GCDC for D, such that X ⊆ G.
In particular, W refutes γ (F, ⊥) iff F is a p-morphic image of W .
Proof: As in Lemmas 3.3 and 3.17. 2
Thus unlike canonical formulas, we can define canonical rules in a straightforward way even for nontransitive frames while preserving the refutation conditions. Nevertheless, their usefulness is considerably limited by their incompleteness:
The modal logic D = K + 3 is not equivalent to any set of canonical rules over K. Proof: "←": Clearly, any logic derives the frame rules of all finite frames which do not validate it.
"→": If F contains no dead end, then F D, and
we define a frame G = F∪ {a} by making x R a R u for every x ∈ G, and u ∈ d. We have G D, and the identity mapping from F ⊆ G to F is a subreduction with GCDC for D.
2 (Claim 1)
To finish the proof, consider the Kripke frame W = ω, > . On the one hand, W D. On the other hand, every point of W is definable by a variable-free formula, hence W has no finite p-morphic image. In particular, all frame rules γ (F, ⊥) are valid in W . 2
The main application we have for nontransitive canonical rules is a description of splittings in the lattice of rule systems. Definition 6.4 A splitting pair in a lattice L is a pair a, b of elements of L such that L = a↓∪ b↑. If this holds, then b is uniquely determined by a and vice versa. We write b = L/a, and we say that a splits L, and b is a splitting companion of a. We will usually write A/B instead of Ext m A/B or Ext 1 A/B. See [6, 25] for more details on splittings. In particular, observe that if a splits L, then it is strongly meet-prime: if X ⊆ L is such that X ≤ a, then x ≤ a for some x ∈ X. Theorem 6.5 Let A be a rule system over K. (ii ) If A has the finite model property, then all splittings of Ext m A are of the form given in (i ).
The same holds for intuitionistic rule systems, with δ in place of γ. (ii) Let B, A/B be a splitting pair. By assumption
hence B ⊇ Th m (F ) for some finite F as B is strongly meet-prime. If n = |F |, then F validates the rule
On the other hand, any refined frame validating Size n is easily seen to have at most n points, hence B is complete with respect to a set of Kripke frames of size at most n. This means
thus using once again its meet-primality we obtain B = Th m (F ) for some finite frame F . Clearly F A, as A ⊆ B. By (i) and the uniqueness of splitting companions, we must have
The intuitionistic case is analogous (and indeed follows from the modal case by the results of Section 5).
2 Remark 6.6 Theorem 6.5, stating that every finite frame splits Ext m K, should be contrasted with the result of Blok [4] that only acyclic rooted frames split the lattice NExt K of normal modal logics. (As we will see below, not all finite frames split the lattice Ext 1 K of consequence relations, nevertheless every rooted finite frame still does, with no acyclicity condition.) Lemma 6.7 Let F be a finite Kripke frame, A a consequence relation extending K, and r ∈ F . Then the following conditions are equivalent:
(i ) For every s ∈ F and every W ⊆· F such that r ∈ W and W A, there exists a U ⊆· F such that s ∈ U and U is a p-morphic image of W .
(ii ) For every W ⊆· F such that r ∈ W and W A, we have F Th 1 (W ).
(iii ) For every s ∈ F , A + γ (F, ⊥, {s}) γ (F, ⊥, {r}).
The same holds for intuitionistic rule systems, with δ in place of γ.
Proof: (i) → (ii): If F , and is single-conclusion, there exists a valuation in F such that F a and F, s c for some s ∈ F . By (i), there exists U ⊆· F such that s ∈ U and U is a p-morphic image of W . We have U , hence W . (ii) → (iii): If V is a frame such that V A + γ (F, ⊥, {s}) and V γ (F, ⊥, {r}), there exists W ⊆· F such that r ∈ W and W is a p-morphic image of V by Lemma 6.2. In particular, W A, thus F Th 1 (W ) by (ii). However, F γ (F, ⊥, {s}) and W γ (F, ⊥, {s}), a contradiction.
(iii) → (i): We have W A and W γ (F, ⊥, {r}), thus W γ (F, ⊥, {s}) by (iii), which implies the existence of U by Lemma 6.2.
Remark 6.8 Let us say that a coroot 3 of a finite Kripke frame F, R is a point x ∈ F belonging to an initial cluster of the transitive closure of R; in other words, if y ∈ x↑ for every y such that x ∈ y↑. In conditions (i) and (iii), it obviously suffices to consider only points s which are coroots (and we only need to check one coroot in every initial cluster).
Theorem 6.9 Let A be a consequence relation extending K.
(i ) If F A is a finite Kripke frame, r ∈ F , and the condition of Lemma 6.7 holds, then Th 1 (F ), A + γ (F, ⊥, {r}) is a splitting pair in Ext 1 A.
(ii ) If A has the finite model property, then all splittings of the lattice Ext 1 A are of the form given in (i ).
Moreover, we may assume that r is a coroot of F . The same holds for intuitionistic rule systems, with δ in place of γ.
Proof: (i) Clearly A ⊆ Th 1 (F ) and γ (F, ⊥, {r}) / ∈ Th 1 (F ). Let B ⊇ A be a consequence relation such that γ (F, ⊥, {r}) / ∈ B. By Lemma 6.2, there exists W ⊆· F such that r ∈ W and W B. In particular, W A, hence F B by (ii) of Lemma 6.7.
(ii) Let B, A/B be a splitting pair. As B is strongly meet-prime and
we have B ⊇ Th 1 (F ) for some finite frame F . In particular, Th(B) is a locally tabular logic; as B is complete wrt a class of finitely generated descriptive Th(B)-frames, it has the finite model property. Using its meet-primality again, we obtain B = Th 1 (F ) for some finite F . For every s ∈ F , we have F γ (F, ⊥, {s}), hence A + γ (F, ⊥, {s}) ⊇ A/B. Pick a singleconclusion rule ∈ A/B such that F . Clearly A/B = A + . There exists a valuation in F and r ∈ F such that F a , and F, r c . Let r be any coroot of F such that r ∈ r↑. Then W for every W ⊆· F such that r ∈ F , hence A/B = A + γ (F, ⊥, {r}). Consequently, condition (iii) of Lemma 6.7 holds, and A/B = A + γ (F, ⊥, {r}).
Remark 6.10 We may have Th 1 (F ) = Th 1 (G) even if F and G are nonisomorphic frames, and in principle it could happen that only one of them satisfies the conditions of Lemma 6.7. However, the proof of Theorem 6.9 actually shows that B = Th 1 (F ) splits Ext 1 A iff F satisfies the conditions of Lemma 6.7, hence we do not have to worry about alternative representations of B.
•
Figure 1: see Remark 6.11
Remark 6.11 Condition (i) of Lemma 6.7 is implied by the simpler condition (i') For every s ∈ F there exists a p-morphism f of F onto its generated subframe such that s ∈ f (r)↑.
Furthermore, it suffices to check only coroots s. However, condition (i') is strictly stronger than (i), as exemplified by the frame in Figure 1 , which satisfies (i) but not (i').
Our final task is to characterize the canonical rules admissible in K, in the spirit of Theorem 4.9.
Definition 6.12 Let LR denote Löb's rule
We introduce the sequences of rules
In nontransitive context, we redefine a reflexive (irreflexive) tight predecessor of a subset X of a frame W to be a point t such that t↑ = {t} ∪ X (t↑ = X, respectively).
We will need the following combinatorial principle used in the theory of the Rudin-Keisler ordering [7] , known as Katětov's lemma on three sets: Theorem 6.13 (Katětov [22] ) If f : X → X has no fixpoints, we can partition X into three disjoint sets
The following lemma is somewhat stronger than what we really need, but we find it instructive to know the frame conditions corresponding to the rules we deal with. Recall that a frame W, R is converse well-founded, if every nonempty subset X ⊆ W has an R-maximal element (i.e., an x ∈ X such that x R y for no y ∈ X). In particular, every converse wellfounded frame is irreflexive. A finite frame is converse well-founded iff it contains no cycle: a sequence of points {x i | i ≤ n} ⊆ W such that x 0 R x 1 R · · · R x n = x 0 for some n ≥ 1. Lemma 6.14 (i ) LR is admissible in K, and corresponds to converse well-founded Kripke frames.
(ii ) E • is admissible in K. It is d-persistent, and corresponds to frames where every finite subset has a reflexive tight predecessor.
(iii ) E • is admissible in K. It is d-persistent, and corresponds to frames where every finite subset has an irreflexive tight predecessor.
Proof: (i) If LR fails in W under a valuation , then {x | x p} is a nonempty set without an R-maximal element, and vice versa. The rule is K-admissible, as K is complete wrt finite irreflexive intransitive trees, which are converse well-founded.
(ii) Assume that K j ψ j → ϕ i for every i < n, and pick Kripke models F i , such that F i , x i j ψ j ∧ ¬ϕ i for some x i . Define a new model F by taking the disjoint union of F i together with a new reflexive point a, which sees exactly the points x i . Then F, a j (ψ j ↔ 2ψ j ) ∧ i ¬2ϕ i .
Let W be a frame which has •-tp of all finite subsets, and a valuation which refutes (E • ) c . Pick points x i j q j ∧ ¬p i , and let t be a •-tp of {x i | i < n}. Then t j (q j ↔ 2q j ) ∧ i ¬2p i , thus W E • .
Conversely, let W be a Kripke frame of size at least 2 (the other cases are easy) which validates E • , and let X = {x i | i < n} be its finite subset. Choose a function f on W such that f (x) = x, f (x) / ∈ X, x R f (x) if possible, f (x) = x otherwise. By Katětov's lemma, there exists a partitioning W = W 0∪ W 1∪ W 2 such that f [W j ]∩W j = ∅. We define a valuation by u p i ⇔ u = x i , u q j ⇔ u ∈ W j ∪ X.
As x i j q j ∧ ¬p i for every i, and W validates E • , there exists a t ∈ W such that t j (q j ↔ 2q j ) ∧ i ¬2p i . Clearly t R x i for every i. We claim that t↑ ⊆ X ∪ {t}: if not, then f (t) ∈ t↑ (X ∪ {t}). However, let j be such that t ∈ W j . As t q j , we have t 2q j , thus f (t) q j , and f (t) ∈ X ∪ W j , a contradiction. Finally, if t is not reflexive, then t↑ ⊆ X, hence t j 2q j , thus t j q j . This is only possible for t ∈ X, but then t R t, a contradiction. Thus t is a •-tp of X.
Let W, R, P be a descriptive frame validating E • , let X = {x i | i < n} be its finite subset, and consider the set S = {¬2A | A ∈ P, X A} ∪ {A ↔ 2A | A ∈ P, X ⊆ A}.
The set {A ∈ P | x i ∈ A} is a filter for any i. If S is a finite subset of S such that S = ∅, we thus have
for some A i ∈ P such that x i / ∈ A i , and B j ∈ P such that X ⊆ B j . By W E • , we obtain j B j ⊆ A i for some i. However, x i ∈ j B j A i , a contradiction. We have thus verified that S has fip.
By compactness of W , there exists a point t ∈ S. If t ∈ 2A, we have t ∈ A and X ⊆ A, hence t R X, t by refinement of W . On the other hand, if z = t and z / ∈ X, we can find A ∈ P such that z / ∈ A and {t} ∪ X ⊆ A as W is refined. Then t ∈ (A ↔ 2A) ∈ S, hence t ∈ 2A, which implies ¬(t R z). Consequently t is a •-tp of X.
(iii) is similar to (ii), but easier. 2
Incidentally, we observe that | ∼ K is "Kripke inconsistent": Proof: If W LR, then W is converse well-founded by Lemma 6.14. We can define a set X ⊆ W satisfying x ∈ X iff ∃y (x R y ∧ y / ∈ X)
by well-founded recursion, hence ¬(p ↔ 2p) / fails in W . 2
Theorem 6.16
The following are equivalent for any canonical rule = γ(F, D):
(ii ) is derivable in K + LR or K + E • .
(iii ) F contains a cycle, or D is nonempty.
Proof: (ii) → (i) follows from Lemma 6.14.
(iii) → (ii): If F contains a cycle x 0 R x 1 R · · · R x n = x 0 , then the assumptions of γ(F, D) contain the formulas 2p x i+1 → p x i for each i < n. Putting α = i p x i , we obtain (γ (F, D) )
Assume that F is acyclic, and d ∈ D, we will show that γ(F, D) ∈ K + E • . Assume for contradiction that W E • is a descriptive frame which refutes γ(F, D), and let f be the induced subreduction of W to F with GCDC for D. We can pick x a ∈ f −1 [a] for each a ∈ d. By Lemma 6.14, there exists a •-tp t of the set {x a | a ∈ d}. As F is irreflexive, we have t / ∈ dom(f ). Then f [t↑] = d contradicts GCDC.
(i) → (iii): Let F be a finite acyclic (i.e., converse well-founded) Kripke frame, and D = ∅. As F is descriptive and finitely generated, it is (isomorphic to) a generated subframe of a canonical frame C = C n (K) for some n < ω (cf. [6, Thm. 8 .60]). We have F 2 k ⊥ for some k < ω. The subset of C defined by 2 k ⊥ is finite, and C is refined, hence F as well as all its elements are definable in C. It follows that the identity mapping on F ⊆ C is a subreduction of C to F , thus C γ(F ) = γ(F, D), and γ(F, D) / ∈ | ∼ K . 2
The easiness of the proof of Theorem 6.16 suggests that rather than being a progress towards the solution of the long-standing problem of admissibility in K, it is just a further testimony that nontransitive canonical rules are plagued with incompleteness. We can indeed supply a specific counterexample: Example 6.17 K + LR + E • does not derive E • , hence no rule system between K + E • and | ∼ K is axiomatizable by canonical rules.
Proof (sketch): Let F be any finite acyclic frame. We construct a new frame by repeating the following procedure: we take its finite subset X, and expand the frame by new points {z X,n | n ∈ ω}, where z X,0 is a dead end, and z X,n+1 ↑ = X ∪ {z X,n }. We can arrange the order of the steps so that the frame F ∞ we obtain as the union after ω steps has all its finite subsets taken care of. It is easy to see that F ∞ is converse well-founded, hence F ∞ LR. Let P be the set of subsets A ⊆ F ∞ such that for each X, {n | z X,n ∈ A} is finite or cofinite. One can check that the chain {z X,n | n < ω} behaves essentially as a •-tp of X wrt valuations from P , hence the frame F ∞ , P validates E • . Now, take F = {a} to be the irreflexive singleton, and let be the valuation on F ∞ such that u p iff u = a. Then makes 2p → 2⊥ true in F ∞ , but p → ⊥ fails in a, hence
As we have seen, canonical rules, and specifically frame rules, can be applied in nontransitive context to a certain extent mimicking the behaviour of frame formulas in the transitive case. While this gives us more power than what we can achieve in similar situations with canonical formulas, we cannot expect serious progress with admissible rules and other areas comparable to the transitive case without a completeness theorem for canonical rules. It remains open whether we can generalize canonical rules to obtain complete axiomatization of rule systems over K. In principle, it could be easier to devise such complete canonical rules than canonical formulas, nevertheless both seem to meet similar serious combinatorial obstacles, and the goal remains elusive.
